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Abstract
We consider a newsvendor who earns a revenue from the sales of her product to end users
as well as from multiple advertisers paying to obtain access to those end users. We study the
optimal decisions of a price-taking and a price-setting newsvendor when the advertisers have
private information about their willingness to pay. We focus on the impact of the number
of advertisers on the newsvendor’s optimal decisions. We find that regardless of the number
of advertisers, the newsvendor may exclude advertisers with a low willingness to pay and
distort the price and inventory from their system-efficient levels to screen the advertisers.
Moreover, the newsvendor’s decision to exclude an advertiser is based exclusively on that
advertiser’s characteristics, and the newsvendor’s optimal decision thus reveals independence
among the advertisers. Nonetheless, the profits of the newsvendor and the advertisers also
display network effects as both increase in the number of advertisers. Finally, our numerical
results show that the newsvendor prefers an equivalent single advertiser to multiple adver-
tisers due to the pooling effect.
Key words : newsvendor model; inventory; pricing; mechanism design; revenue management
1. Introduction
In some industries, a seller collects revenue not only from her product sales, but also from
selling access to the product’s end users to third parties. This revenue pattern exists in
the publishing industry, where advertisers pay newspapers and magazines for the right to
advertise within their publications. This secondary revenue can represent a large share of a
seller’s revenue. Advertising income, for instance, made up between 19% and 83% of the total
revenue of top selling magazines in 2007, including National Geographic, The Economist,
and Newsweek (Magazine Publishers of America, 2008). Newspapers similarly derive a large
percentage of income from advertising. For example, in 2009, The New York Times reported
revenues of $683 million from circulation and $797 million from advertising (The New York
Times Company, 2009).
Our paper looks at this business setting in which a newsvendor obtains revenue from
multiple advertisers. A similar model was introduced by Wu et al. (2011) who formulate a
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newsvendor problem in which a second source of revenue from a single advertiser is consid-
ered. Magazines and newspapers, however, carry many advertisements. In fact, the number
of pages of a magazine issue can vary with its popularity with advertisers, the September
issue of major fashion magazines being a well-known example. Indeed, fashion houses want
to run their advertisements to coincide with the launch of their new collections at the major
fashion shows held in September. Publishers have even started to report the number of ad
pages in their September issues, with Vogue well in front with the 532 pages of advertisements
in their September 2010 issue (Peters, 2010).
We study how the multiplicity of advertisers affects the newsvendor’s decisions. Be-
sides operational decisions such as product pricing, inventory (also referred to as production
quantity), and advertising rate, Wu et al. (2011) also showed that the newsvendor’s optimal
policy may exclude the advertiser if his contribution to the newsvendor is insufficient. In
addition, in their exogenous price model, the newsvendor may set an even higher threshold
on the advertiser’s contribution for the newsvendor to produce anything. With multiple
advertisers, however, it is conceivable that the decisions regarding an advertiser’s exclusion
might be influenced by the presence of other advertisers, even when we restrict the model to
the case where there is no competition between advertisers. Note that this assumption of low
or no competition for access is reasonable for magazines that can expand their advertising
linage by increasing the number of pages.
We consider the exogenous and endogenous price models and characterize the optimal
decisions of the newsvendor (she), taking into account the fact that each advertiser (he) has
private information about his willingness to pay (or benefit type) for advertisements. To fully
understand the impact of multiple advertisers, we set up a model in which the newsvendor
chooses her product inventory (and price in the endogenous price model) to maximize her
expected profit by charging multiple advertisers who desire to obtain access to the product’s
end users. The newsvendor sets the fee individually for each advertiser, taking into consid-
eration the benefit the advertiser derives from each product sold, or benefit type. Within
the principal-agent framework, we model the newsvendor as the principal, i.e., the leader,
and the advertisers as the agents. An advertiser’s benefit type is his private information,
which is unknown to the newsvendor and other advertisers. Note that advertisers belong
to two different categories: individuals or small advertisers placing classifieds or small ads
at a pre-determined rate card price per line, and large corporate clients who run regular
advertising campaigns with the newsvendor over half or even full pages. Our model focuses
on the latter category of clients. Although the newsvendor also publishes a rate card for
her corporate clients, it is common industry practice to negotiate individual discounts with
each advertiser (Nicholson, 2001). Sass (2009) writes that “behind closed doors, many big
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publishers give substantial discounts to media buyers off their official rate cards” and reports
that Time Inc.’s magazines gave discounts of 56% on average in 2009. Indeed, flexible pricing
benefits the newsvendor as it enables her to gain value with an inclusive pricing paradigm
that links the quantity produced and advertisement prices to extract maximum profit from
her heterogenous advertisers.
Our work is closely related to the literature on the newsvendor problem and principal-
agent models. The newsvendor problem originally emerged as a cost minimization problem.
We refer the readers to Porteus (1990) and Khouja (1999) for excellent reviews of the early
development of this problem and its various extensions. The extension most closely related
to our paper is the introduction of endogenous pricing, which transforms the newsvendor’s
problem into a profit maximization problem. Petruzzi and Dada (1999) summarize the
early work on the joint inventory and pricing problem. Ha (2001) characterizes the joint
concavity of the objective function directly. To the best of our knowledge, little research has
been done to explore the newsvendor’s decision problem when her profit is enhanced by the
opportunity to earn secondary revenue, and our work attempts to fill this gap. More recently,
the newsvendor literature has been further expanded along several dimensions. Granot and
Yin (2007), O¨zer et al. (2007), and Liu and O¨zer (2010) consider the interaction of parties in a
supply chain. Keren and Pliskin (2006) and Se´vi (2010) deal with a risk-averse newsvendor.
Qin et al. (2011) provide an up-to-date survey of the newsvendor literature since Khouja
(1999).
The principal-agent setting has been extensively researched (see Hartmann-Wendels,
1993, for a review) and widely applied in the operations literature. Studies have investi-
gated incentives in new product development projects (Mihm, 2010), issues in outsourcing
(Ren and Zhou, 2008; Kaya and O¨zer, 2009; O¨zer and Raz, 2011), procurement and capacity
contracting (Cachon and Zhang, 2006; Xu et al., 2010), disruptions and contracts in supply
chains (Corbett et al., 2005; Iyer et al., 2005; Ahn et al., 2008), incentives and individual
motivation (Radhakrishnan and Ronen, 1999; Forno and Merlone, 2010), and information
sharing in a newsvendor setting (O¨zer and Wei, 2006; Wang et al., 2009; Gan et al., 2010).
Our newsvendor model with multiple advertisers presents two slightly atypical features.
First, we choose to allow a cutoff policy, i.e., we dispense with the assumption common to the
majority of the literature that all agent types participate in the contract. Moorthy (1984)
argues that the cutoff policy is optimal based on numerical results. Corbett et al. (2004)
assume a cutoff policy and then find the optimal cutoff level. Ha (2001) formally establishes
the optimality of the cutoff policy by exploiting structural similarities between the complete
information and asymmetric information cases. More recently, Lutze and O¨zer (2008) make
use of the monotonicity of the agent’s payoff function to prove the optimality of the cutoff
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policy when agent types are discrete. We consider continuous agent types and our approach
complements that of Lutze and O¨zer (2008).
Second, we allow multiple agents to participate in the same contract. Demski and Sap-
pington (1984) discuss contracts with multiple agents, and reveal the importance of the
correlation among advertisers. Correlation allows the principal to infer information from
one agent’s type about the other agents’ types. In the absence of correlation, i.e., the agents’
types are independent of each other, the authors find that each agent should be treated as an
individual. However, uncorrelated agents might nonetheless be linked by a reward function
based on a variable which is common to all agents (McAfee and McMillan, 1991; Li and
Balachandran, 1997). In a setting where the principal’s revenue depends on the common
output of several agents, these studies show that even uncorrelated agents cannot be treated
independently. When a contract is written on joint output, each individual agent’s revenue
will be influenced by the other agents’ efforts, thus linking their effort levels. Similarly, in our
setting, the sales of the newsvendor’s product to end users will be common to all advertisers,
even though it is possible to charge a different fee to each advertiser. Our paper, however,
differs in that the newsvendor (principal) collects revenue from two sources, her own product
sales and the advertisers’ (agents) fees.
Our results and contributions are summarized as follows. First, we show that each
advertiser is considered for inclusion in the contract based on his individual contribution
to the newsvendor, and the advertisers are independent in that sense. An advertiser is
cut off based exclusively on his net contribution to the newsvendor, and this cutoff level is
determined in the same way irrespective of the number of advertisers. Second, we find that
there is interdependence among the advertisers when they are included in the contract. In
the exogenous price case, for an unprofitable product, the newsvendor determines a break-
even boundary that the advertisers’ aggregate contribution must exceed to make production
and sales profitable for the newsvendor. Therefore, the contribution of one advertiser affects
whether the newsvendor will produce and thus whether there will be a real contract (a
contract with positive inventory) for all the advertisers. More generally speaking, in both
the endogenous and exogenous price cases, we find that there exist network effects and
that the advertisers benefit from the presence of additional advertisers. Indeed, for each
advertiser that is added, the newsvendor’s inventory will increase, which benefits all the
advertisers in the relationship. Third, we find that the newsvendor’s pricing power may
benefit the newsvendor, the advertisers and the consumers, contrary to the expectation that
it would only favor the newsvendor at the expense of the advertisers and consumers. Finally,
our numerical results show that the newsvendor prefers an equivalent single advertiser to
multiple advertisers due to the pooling effect.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model frame-
work. Sections 3 and 4 examine the exogenous and endogenous price models, respectively.
Section 5 presents a numerical analysis to complement our analytical results. The paper
concludes in Section 6. All proofs in the paper are provided in the Appendix.
2. Model Framework
The notation we use is summarized below. In our model formulation and analysis, the
subscripts and arguments of functions are omitted for brevity, unless this results in confusion.
Variables with upper case superscripts indicate optimal solutions.
Parameters:
p – unit selling price of the newsvendor’s product (a decision variable in the
endogenous price model)
c – unit cost of the newsvendor’s product (note that we do not require that c < p)
X – random demand for the newsvendor’s product, nonnegative
f(x) – probability density function (pdf) of demand, positive
F (x) – cumulative distribution function (cdf) of demand
n – number of advertisers, index i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, −i refers to all but the ith advertiser
θi – advertiser i’s benefit type, nonnegative, with Θ = (θ1, θ2, ..., θn)
θˇi – advertiser i’s self-reported benefit type, nonnegative, with Θˇ = (θˇ1, θˇ2, ..., θˇn)
θˆi – advertiser i’s cutoff benefit type, nonnegative
θbi – advertiser i’s break-even benefit type, nonnegative
[θi, θi] – support of θi and θˇi, θi ≥ 0
ψi(θi) – probability density function of θi
Ψi(θi) – cumulative distribution function of θi
Decisions of the newsvendor:
ti(Θ) – transfer payment from the advertiser, contingent on his benefit type
q(Θ) – newsvendor’s inventory decision, contingent on the advertisers’ benefit types
Decision of the advertisers:
δi(θi) – advertiser i’s participation decision; 1 means participation and 0 otherwise.
As we are including the newsvendor’s second source of revenue, the unit selling price p
need not necessarily be bounded below by the unit cost c. This allows for the possible scenario
where p ≤ c, i.e., the newsvendor sells below cost, as exemplified by the recent proliferation
of free newspapers. Our model considers the exogenous and endogenous price cases, i.e., a
5
price-taking and price-setting newsvendor, respectively. We focus on the exogenous price
model in the following description of our model framework for the convenience of exposition.
We define the expected sales S(q) = EX [min(q, x)] = q −
∫ q
0
F (x)dx, which can be
verified as concave increasing in q. The newsvendor sells a product and receives a sales
revenue pS(q). The newsvendor’s product, however, can yield a benefit to the advertisers
and the newsvendor can thus charge each advertiser i a payment ti for the right to access this
benefit, e.g., for the right to place an advertisement in a magazine/newspaper. This creates
a second source of revenue for the newsvendor who receives
∑n
i=1 ti, the total payment from
all advertisers.
An advertiser i’s total benefit from accessing the newsvendor’s product is proportional
to his benefit type θi and the expected number of products sold S(q). The type indicates
the profit per consumer who has been exposed to the advertisement, whereas sales matter
because the higher the circulation, the more consumers are aware of the advertiser’s product.
We define advertiser i’s total benefit as θiS(q) (see Wu et al., 2011, for more detail). As
the newsvendor does not know advertiser i’s benefit type, she faces a typical principal-agent
problem in which the uninformed principal (the newsvendor) offers a menu of contracts
to informed agents. In such a setting, the newsvendor decides on the contract terms, the
common inventory and the individual transfer payment for each advertiser, under information
asymmetry.
The advertisers’ benefit types θi are independently drawn from cumulative distributions
Ψi(θi) (also called prior beliefs) on the support [θi, θi]. The realization of each advertiser’s
benefit type is only known to himself, and the distributions Ψi(θi) are the common prior
beliefs of the newsvendor and the other advertisers (than advertiser i). These prior beliefs
are assumed to be independent of each other because each advertiser is a different company
with unrelated marketing campaigns and there is no competition for advertising space. Thus,
each advertiser’s type is unaffected by the other advertisers.
The sequence of events in our model is depicted in Figure 1. At time T = 1, each
advertiser discovers his benefit type θi. Then, at T = 2, the newsvendor designs a menu of
contracts {q(Θ), t1(Θ), ..., tn(Θ)} and announces {q(Θ), ti(Θ)} to advertiser i. The adver-
tisers decide whether to participate and simultaneously report a type θˇi ∈ [θi, θi] at T = 3.
The newsvendor chooses the inventory based on the collectively reported Θˇ at T = 4. At
T = 5, the demand is realized and finally, at T = 6, the newsvendor collects the transfer
payments from the advertisers.
The above timeline follows standard modeling assumptions for principal-agent models
with multiple agents (see Chapter 7.4 of Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). The menu of con-
tracts {q(Θ), t1(Θ), ..., tn(Θ)} specifies an inventory q(Θ) together with an individual trans-
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Figure 1: Timeline of Events
fer payment ti(Θ) for each advertiser i, both determined for each possible combination of
advertisers’ types. The implementation of the contract merits some further discussion. The
contracting game is based on the revelation principle, which states that there exists an op-
timal mechanism that induces truth telling. Accordingly, in negotiating the contract the
principal may without loss of generality use a communication game with a direct mechanism
such that the agent truthfully reports his type (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). Bester and
Strausz (2000) confirm that the revelation principle is applicable to the multi-agent case
and ensures that all agents simultaneously announce their types truthfully. In our problem
context, the direct mechanism implies that advertiser i does not choose the exact inventory
or transfer fee he will pay, as that will depend on the types of the other advertisers. Instead,
he directly reports a type θˇi. The advertisers simultaneously report their types, which jointly
determine the inventory of the newsvendor and the transfer fee each advertiser has to pay.
3. The Exogenous Price Model
As frequent price adjustments are uncommon in the newspaper industry, we start by tak-
ing price as given and analyze how the second source of revenue affects the newsvendor’s
inventory decision.
The newsvendor could potentially choose from a wide range of contract designs, making
this problem hard to solve. However, as discussed above, the direct revelation principle
enables us to restrict our search to incentive compatible contracts, i.e., contracts that make
it optimal for the advertisers to reveal their true benefit types Θ.
In anticipation of the advertisers’ rational responses δi(θi), the newsvendor designs a
menu of contracts {q(Θ), t1(Θ), ... , tn(Θ)} to maximize her expected profit as follows.
max
q(Θ)≥0, ti(Θ)
EΘ
{
n∑
i=1
[δi(θi)ti(Θ)] + pS(q(Θ))− cq(Θ)
}
, (1)
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s.t.
Eθ−i {δi(θi)[θiS(q(Θ))− ti(Θ)]} ≥ 0, ∀i, ∀θi, (2)
Eθ−i {δi(θi)[θiS(q(Θ))− ti(Θ)]} ≥ Eθ−i
{
δi(θi)[θiS(q(θˇi, θ−i))− ti(θˇi, θ−i)]
}
, ∀i, ∀θi, ∀θˇi.
(3)
In the above formulation, the expectation in the objective function is taken over all the
possible types of all advertisers, as the types are unknown to the newsvendor when she
designs the contract. Equations (2) and (3) are the individual rationality (IR) constraint
and incentive compatibility (IC) constraint, respectively, commonly found in the standard
mechanism design problem. The IR constraint ensures that the participating advertisers
make at least their reservation profit, which is normalized to 0 without loss of generality.
The IC constraint follows from the revelation principle. It guarantees that a participating
advertiser achieves the highest expected profit by reporting his benefit type truthfully. It is
worth noting that in the constraints for advertiser i, the expectation is taken over the possible
types of the other advertisers −i. Thus, our formulation uses a Bayesian mechanism, where
the constraints are required to hold only on average over the other advertisers’ reports θ−i.
Also, this Bayesian formulation for each advertiser supposes that all other players report
truthfully. See Chapter 7 of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for a more detailed discussion.
In what follows, we take the backward induction approach to solve this leader-follower
game. We start by characterizing the advertisers’ participation decisions δi(θi) for a given
menu {q(Θ), t1(Θ), ... , tn(Θ)} designed by the newsvendor, and then substitute these opti-
mal participation decisions into the newsvendor’s decision problem to find her optimal menu
of contracts.
3.1 The Advertisers’ Optimal Decisions
Note that the IR and IC constraints can be viewed as the advertisers’ optimization problem.
The IR constraint determines whether an advertiser participates in the game. If he does,
then the IC constraint determines which benefit type is optimal for him to report.
Advertiser i with type θi will decide not to participate in the game if and only if he incurs
an expected loss for all items in the menu of contracts offered by the newsvendor. That is,
δi(θi) = 0 if and only if
Eθ−i [θiS(q(θˇi, θ−i))− ti(θˇi, θ−i)] < 0, ∀i, ∀θˇi. (4)
The following lemma characterizes the advertisers’ participation decision.
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Lemma 1 If advertiser i does not participate in the game when his benefit type is θi , then
he will also not participate when his type is lower than θi.
Lemma 1 implies that each advertiser’s participation decision is of a threshold type: for
any advertiser i, there exists a cutoff level θˆi such that if θi ≥ θˆi, the advertiser will participate
in the contract, otherwise he will not. That is, δi(θi) = 1,∀θi ≥ θˆi; and 0 otherwise. The
value of the cutoff level θˆi will be determined by the newsvendor’s optimal contract design.
Our characterization of the optimal cutoff policy is similar in spirit to the approach taken by
Lutze and O¨zer (2008), because we both make use of the monotonicity of the agent’s payoff
function in his type, despite different problem structures. More specifically, Proposition 5(b)
of Lutze and O¨zer (2008) shows that the retailer’s cost function is increasing in his type. As
a result, if type i retailer is cut off (i.e., his cost reverts to the reservation level Umaxr ), then
type j (j ≥ i) retailer will have an even higher (in a weak sense) cost and will also be cut
off. Our characterization of the cutoff policy employs a similar logic.
In view of Lemma 1, we can now limit our attention to the case θi ≥ θˆi (for all i), and
replace δi(θi) with 1 in advertiser i’s optimization problem described by his IC constraint.
The IC constraint essentially means that a type θi advertiser i maximizes his expected profit
G(θˇi) = Eθ−i [θiS(q(θˇi, θ−i)) − ti(θˇi, θ−i)] by choosing to report an appropriate θˇi. If his
optimal decision is to report θi, then the contract is truth revealing. The following lemma
presents a condition for the advertisers to report their types truthfully.
Lemma 2 An incentive compatible contract {q(Θ), t1(Θ), ... , tn(Θ)} must satisfy the fol-
lowing necessary condition:
Eθ−i [ti(Θ)] = Eθ−i [θiS(q(Θ))]−
∫ θi
θˆi
Eθ−i [S(q(θ˜i, θ−i))]dθ˜i, ∀i, ∀θi ≥ θˆi. (5)
Furthermore, if q(Θ) is monotonic, i.e., dq(Θ)/dθi ≥ 0, ∀i, the above condition (5) is also
sufficient for incentive compatibility.
This lemma gives the conditions that must be met for the optimal menu of contracts
designed by the newsvendor to be an optimal, truth telling mechanism. After solving the
newsvendor’s optimization problem, we verify that the optimal transfer payment and inven-
tory satisfy the above conditions.
3.2 The Newsvendor’s Optimal Contract Menu
Based on Lemmas 1 and 2, we can substitute the expected transfer payments defined in
Equation (5) into Equation (1) and then integrate by parts to reformulate the newsvendor’s
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problem as follows (see proof of Theorem 1 in the Appendix for details).
max
q(Θ)≥0, Θˆ
EΘ
{(
p(Θ) +
n∑
i=1
[δi(θi)Vi (θi)]
)
S(q(Θ))− cq(Θ)
}
, (6)
where Vi(θi) is defined as follows.
Definition 1 A virtual benefit type is Vi(θi) = θi − 1−Ψi(θi)ψi(θi) , ∀i.
Similar to the single advertiser case studied by Wu et al. (2011), the above definition of
advertiser i’s virtual type can be viewed as his net contribution to the newsvendor per unit
of sales of the newsvendor’s product. Indeed, in the absence of information asymmetry, the
newsvendor would set advertiser i’s fee at his commonly known benefit type θi per unit of
sales. Information asymmetry, however, introduces an information cost [1−Ψi(θi)] /ψi(θi)
as the newsvendor cannot charge advertiser i the full extent of his benefit type. Instead, the
newsvendor has to provide an incentive to induce advertiser i to report his type truthfully.
The virtual benefit type nets the information cost from the benefit type, and represents
advertiser i’s contribution per unit of sales under information asymmetry.
The above reformulation merits some discussion. First, the newsvendor has to determine
the optimal cutoff levels for all advertisers, and an additional decision Θˆ is introduced into
the newsvendor’s problem. Once the optimal cutoff levels are determined, the advertisers’
participation decisions δi(θi) can then be replaced by either 0 or 1, depending on the value
of θi compared to the cutoff level θˆi. Second, condition (5) is used to substitute the transfer
payment decision out of the newsvendor’s objective function without verifying whether it
is sufficient at this point. Later, we will show that the optimal solution to q(Θ) is indeed
monotonically non-decreasing, thus assuring the sufficiency of condition (5). Finally, the
above reformulation indicates that the newsvendor will receive no transfer payment only if
all the advertisers are simultaneously below their respective cutoff levels (i.e., δi(θi) = 0 for
any i). In that case, her problem reduces to the traditional newsvendor problem.
To facilitate further discussion, we define the following notation.
Definition 2 A virtual price is pˆ(Θ) = p+
∑n
i=1 V
+
i (θi), where V
+
i (θi) = max(0, Vi(θi)).
This definition indicates that under information asymmetry, the role of the second source
of revenue is to augment the selling price p by the advertisers’ aggregate contribution to the
newsvendor. The intuition behind the “+” operator in the definition is that all types with
negative net contribution will be cut off, as will be formally shown in Theorem 1 below.
In the mechanism design literature, the increasing failure rate (IFR) assumption, namely,
the assumption that ψi(θi)/ [1−Ψi(θi)] is increasing in θi, ∀i, is usually made to ensure incen-
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tive compatibility of the optimal menu of contracts. Our problem requires a similar technical
condition, as stated below. One can verify that it is weaker than the IFR assumption.
Assumption 1 dVi(θi)/dθi ≥ 0.
Let a decision with superscript A denote its optimal solution. We can now write the
newsvendor’s optimal menu of contracts in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 Under Assumption 1, the optimal cutoff level θˆAi for each advertiser is such
that Vi(θˆ
A
i ) = 0, ∀i, and the optimal menu of contracts is:
qA(Θ) = F−1
[(
pˆ(Θ)− c
pˆ(Θ)
)+]
, (7)
Eθ−i [t
A
i (Θ)] =
{
Eθ−i [θiS(q
A(Θ))]− ∫ θi
θˆAi
Eθ−i [S(q
A(θ˜i, θ−i))]dθ˜i, ∀i,∀θi ≥ θˆAi ,
Eθ−i [θˆ
A
i S(q
A(θˆAi , θ−i))], ∀i,∀θi ≤ θˆAi .
(8)
The newsvendor’s decision to include an advertiser depends on the advertiser’s virtual
benefit type Vi(θi), as a measure of his net contribution to the newsvendor. The newsvendor
only includes the advertisers that make a nonnegative net contribution in the game. If none
of the advertisers merit inclusion in the newsvendor’s contract, the newsvendor produces
the optimal inventory without secondary revenue. This ensures that the optimal profit
(inventory) with secondary revenue will never be less than the optimal profit (inventory)
without secondary revenue.
The assumption that Vi(θ) is non-decreasing implies that if Vi(θi) > 0, then the equation
Vi(θˆ
A
i ) = 0 will have no root and the optimal cutoff level reduces to θi, ∀i. We assume that
Vi(θi) < 0 to exclude that trivial case.
Theorem 1 specifies that the expected transfer payment from advertiser i should be set
at Eθ−i
[
θˆAi S(q
A(θˆAi , θ−i))
]
for all types of advertiser i below his cutoff level θˆAi . However,
multiple solutions to this problem exist, as the newsvendor can set any arbitrary transfer
payment for those low types that is large enough to guarantee that advertiser i prefers not to
participate in the game. The chosen value offers the convenience of continuity of Eθ−i [t
A
i (Θ)]
at θˆAi .
The optimal inventory decision qA(Θ) specified in Equation (7) resembles that in the
traditional newsvendor problem, with the virtual price pˆ(Θ) in place of the unit selling price
p. The solution can be interpreted in terms of the newsvendor critical fractile, with the
underage cost being pˆ(Θ) − c, and the overage cost being c. It follows from Assumption 1
that qA(Θ) is increasing in θi, ∀i, thus validating the incentive compatibility of the optimal
11
contract. The “+” operator in the solution is due to the fact that we do not require p > c,
unlike the traditional newsvendor model. This generalization makes sense because in many
cases, the newsvendor sells below cost when there exists a second source of revenue. In those
cases (i.e., when p < c), if the pooled contribution from all advertisers is still insufficient to
help the newsvendor break even, then the newsvendor is better off not producing anything
at all. This observation leads us to define the break-even boundary such that
∑n
i=1 V
+
i (θi) =
c − p > 0, where the sum of net contributions of the participating advertisers covers the
newsvendor’s loss per unit. We define the individual break-even level θbi , determined by
Vi(θ
b
i ) = c − p > 0, as advertiser i’s type for which the newsvendor breaks even when he
is the only advertiser participating in the contract. Given Assumption 1, we know that
θbi > θˆ
A
i .
Note that the newsvendor’s problem with multiple advertisers reduces to a problem with
a single advertiser if all other advertisers −i are below their cutoff levels. The following
corollary shows that the results in the multiple advertisers case can be reduced to those
obtained in Wu et al. (2011) for the single advertiser case.
Corollary 1 Under Assumption 1 and with only one advertiser (or n = 1), the optimal
solution reduces to a cutoff level θˆA1 such that V1(θˆ
A
1 ) = 0 and the following optimal menu of
contracts:
qA(θ1) = F
−1
[(
pˆ(θ1)− c
pˆ(θ1)
)+]
, (9)
tA1 (θ1) =
{
θ1S(q
A(θ1))−
∫ θ1
θˆA1
S(qA(θ˜1))dθ˜1, ∀θ1 ≥ θˆA1 ,
θˆA1 S(q
A(θˆA1 )), ∀θ1 ≤ θˆA1 .
(10)
We would like to draw attention to the fact that the cutoff level is the same regardless
of the number of advertisers. The structure of the optimal contract is similar, but now
the expectation (over all other advertisers) operator for the transfer payment disappears.
Finally, when p < c, the break-even boundary reduces to the individual break-even level
defined above, i.e., θb1, determined by V1(θ
b
1) = c− p > 0.
3.3 An Example
To illustrate the optimal menu of contracts analyzed above and its implementation, let us
consider a numerical example with two advertisers. We assume a selling price p = 2 with a
cost c = 1. The demand is uniformly distributed on [0, 100], and benefit type distributions
of advertisers 1 and 2 are uniform on [10, 20] and [20, 30] respectively. Note that both
advertisers’ virtual benefit types are nonnegative on the entire support, i.e., Vi(θi) = θi −
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[1−Ψi(θi)] /ψi(θi) ≥ 0, for i = 1, 2; hence the optimal menu of contracts will not cut off any
advertiser type.
We insert these parameters into the expected sales function, the virtual price definition,
and the optimal contract terms defined in Theorem 1, which gives us the following equations:
S(q(θ1, θ2)) = q(θ1, θ2)− 1
200
[q(θ1, θ2)]
2,
pˆ(θ1, θ2) = 2θ1 + 2θ2 − 48,
qA(θ1, θ2) = 100− 50
θ1 + θ2 − 24 ,
Eθ2 [t
A
1 (θ1, θ2)] = 500 +
5
4
[
θ1
θ1 + 6
− θ1
θ1 − 4 + ln
8(θ1 − 4)
3(θ1 + 6)
]
, (11)
and
Eθ1 [t
A
2 (θ1, θ2)] = 1000 +
5
4
[
θ2
14− θ2 +
θ2
θ2 − 4 + ln
8(θ2 − 4)
3(θ2 − 14)
]
. (12)
Let us briefly expand on the optimal expected transfer payment. Any tA1 (θ1, θ2), such
that its expectation over θ2 equals the right-hand side of Equation (11), induces advertiser
1 to report his type truthfully. Such tA1 (θ1, θ2) could be independent of θ2 and equal to the
right-hand side, or any function of θ2 which preserves the equality, e.g., by adding a term
(θ2 − 25) whose expectation (over θ2) is 0 to the right-hand side.
The menu of contracts is implemented as follows: each advertiser is only apprised of the
minimum necessary information to make his truthful choice, namely the optimal production
quantity function and his own transfer payment. This means that the newsvendor presents
{qA(θ1, θ2), tA1 (θ1, θ2)} =
{
100− 50
θ1+θ2−24 , 500 +
5
4
[
θ1
θ1+6
− θ1
θ1−4 + ln
8(θ1−4)
3(θ1+6)
]
+ (θ2 − 25)
}
and
{qA(θ1, θ2), tA2 (θ1, θ2)} =
{
100− 50
θ1+θ2−24 , 1000 +
5
4
[
θ2
14−θ2 +
θ2
θ2−4 + ln
8(θ2−4)
3(θ2−14)
]
+ (θ1 − 15)
}
to advertisers 1 and 2 respectively. Note that the transfer payments from advertisers 1 and
2 are arbitrary functions that fulfill Equations (11) and (12), respectively.
3.4 Discussion of Modeling Results
Our analysis shows that while the advertisers are independent with regards to their cutoff
levels, the newsvendor’s inventory decision creates interdependence among them.
The advertisers are independent of each other in the sense that the optimal individual
cutoff level is the same as in the single advertiser case, without being affected by the presence
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of other advertisers. In other words, each advertiser is judged according to his own contri-
bution to the newsvendor on whether he should be induced to participate in the contract.
Furthermore, the optimal contract implies that an advertiser’s actual profit can be made
independent of the ex-post realizations of the other advertisers’ types.
Our results also reveal that the advertisers are interdependent. The advertisers comple-
ment each other because it is their aggregate virtual benefit that determines the newsvendor’s
optimal inventory specified in Equation (7). Hence, an increase in the number of potential
advertisers is beneficial to the system. Our problem displays network effects, i.e., each ad-
vertiser is better off for the presence of other advertisers, as the optimal inventory qA(Θ)
increases and, consequently, the advertisers’ expected profit (their expected informational
rent)
∫ θi
θˆAi
Eθ−i [S(q
A(θ˜i, θ−i))]dθ˜i also increases.
2θ
IIIb
2θ
2
bθ IIIc
IIc
2ˆ
Aθ
IIb
I IIIaIIa
1ˆ
AθΘ 1θ1bθ 1θ
Figure 2: Participation Decisions of Two Advertisers when p < c
The network effects are most salient when the newsvendor sells below cost, i.e., when
p < c. Figure 2 depicts the advertisers’ participation decisions for the two-advertiser case. In
region I, both advertisers are below their individual cutoff level, and the newsvendor prefers
not to produce. Region II (the whole shaded area) is below the break-even boundary, but at
least one advertiser exceeds his individual cutoff level. Nonetheless, the joint contribution
of both advertisers to the newsvendor’s profit is not sufficient to induce production, or
pˆ(Θ) < c, and no transaction occurs. Finally, in region III, the newsvendor and at least one
advertiser (in IIIa: advertiser 1, in IIIb: advertiser 2, and in IIIc: both advertisers) sign a
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contract with strictly positive inventory. It is interesting to note that due to network effects,
in the dotted portion of region IIIc, even though both advertisers are individually below the
break-even benefit level (θbi ), their pooled contribution to the newsvendor’s profit is enough
to encourage production.
In sum, we find that if the advertisers collectively exceed the break-even boundary, then
they are independent of each other in the sense that advertiser i’s participation decision and
expected profit are unaffected by advertisers −i’s benefit type realizations. Nevertheless,
there is still some interdependence among the advertisers, because the newsvendor’s inven-
tory decision depends on the aggregate contribution of all advertisers, and an increase in the
number of advertisers raises the expected profit for each advertiser.
Moreover, an increase in the number of advertisers increases inventory qA(Θ) and, thus,
also benefits both the customers and the newsvendor. To elaborate, an increased inventory
qA(Θ) implies a higher in-stock probability, thus benefiting customers. The higher in-stock
probability, in turn, means the newsvendor can sell her product to more customers. As
a result, she can improve her primary revenue and her secondary revenue, as the more
customers she serves, the larger the expected transfer payments from advertisers.
4. The Endogenous Price Model
In some settings, the newsvendor may be able to set the price of her product. In that case,
we need to endogenize the price decision, and consider the contract design problem of the
newsvendor when facing price-dependent demand.
Following Ru and Wang (2010) and Wu et al. (2011), we assume the demand to be y(p)x,
where a price-independent noise x is scaled by a deterministic downward sloping function
y(p) = ξe−τp, for positive scalar coefficient ξ and price sensitivity coefficient τ . We choose
this particular demand function for two reasons. First, it has been shown to fit empirical
data well (Hoch et al., 1995). Second, it allows for closed-form solutions and guarantees
the monotonicity of the optimal price and inventory decisions (see Wu et al., 2011, for more
discussion). Note that now the newsvendor can choose to make the price contingent on the
advertisers’ types Θ. Also note that the expected sales are dependent on both inventory
and price, and are defined as S(q(Θ), p(Θ)) = EX [min(q(Θ), y(p(Θ))x)]. The newsvendor
designs a menu of contracts {q(Θ), p(Θ), t1(Θ), ... , tn(Θ)} to optimize her expected profit
as follows, assuming the advertisers’ rational responses δi(θi).
max
q(Θ)≥0, p(Θ)≥0, ti(Θ)
EΘ
[
n∑
i=1
[δi(θi)ti(Θ)] + p(Θ)S(q(Θ), p(Θ))− cq(Θ)
]
(13)
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s.t.
Eθ−i {δi(θi)[θiS(q(Θ), p(Θ))− ti(Θ)]} ≥0, ∀i, ∀θi, (14)
Eθ−i {δi(θi)[θiS(q(Θ), p(Θ))− ti(Θ)]} ≥Eθ−i
{
δi(θi)[θiS(q(θˇi, θ−i), p(θˇi, θ−i))− ti(θˇi, θ−i)]
}
,
∀i, ∀θi,∀θˇi. (15)
This formulation resembles its counterpart in the exogenous price model. In the follow-
ing solution procedure, we take the same backward induction approach, starting with the
advertisers’ rational responses.
4.1 The Advertisers’ Optimal Decisions
The characterization of the advertisers’ optimal decisions is similar to that in the exogenous
price case. One can verify that the endogenous price case inherits the cutoff policy charac-
terized in Lemma 1, enabling us to limit our attention to the case θi ≥ θˆi (for any i) only. As
such, we can replace δi(θi) with 1 when solving advertiser i’s optimization problem described
in the IC constraint (Equation (15)).
The following lemma mirrors its counterpart in Lemma 2, with the changes reflecting the
endogenized pricing decision.
Lemma 3 An incentive compatible contract {q(Θ), p(Θ), t1(Θ), ... , tn(Θ)} must satisfy the
following necessary condition:
Eθ−i [ti(Θ)] = Eθ−i [θiS(q(Θ), p(Θ))]−
∫ θi
θˆi
Eθ−i [S(q(θ˜i, θ−i), p(θ˜i, θ−i))]dθ˜i, ∀i, ∀θi ≥ θˆi.
(16)
Furthermore, if dq(Θ)/dθi ≥ 0 and dp(Θ)/dθi ≤ 0, ∀i, the above condition (16) is also
sufficient for incentive compatibility.
4.2 The Newsvendor’s Optimal Contract Menu
The newsvendor’s problem can now be reformulated as follows, by substituting the expected
transfer payments in Equation (16) into Equation (13), followed by an integration by parts.
max
q(Θ)≥0,p(Θ)≥0,Θˆ
EΘ
{(
p(Θ) +
n∑
i=1
[δi(θi)Vi (θi)]
)
S(q(Θ), p(Θ))− cq(Θ)
}
. (17)
We expand the definition of the virtual price to pˆ (Θ, p(Θ)) = p(Θ) +
∑n
i=1 V
+
i (θi), and
let a decision with the superscript E denote its optimal solution. Then the newsvendor’s
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optimal menu of contracts can be summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 Let p0 be the optimal price for the newsvendor in the absence of the secondary
revenue. If the distribution of the random shock x satisfies IFR, namely, if f(x)/[1− F (x)]
is increasing, then under Assumption 1, the optimal cutoff level for each advertiser is such
that Vi(θˆ
E
i ) = 0, ∀i, and the optimal menu of contracts is:
pE(Θ) = max
(
p0,
n∑
i=1
V +i (θi)
)
−
n∑
i=1
V +i (θi), (18)
qE(Θ) = y
(
pE(Θ)
)
F−1
(
pˆ
(
Θ, pE(Θ)
)− c
pˆ (Θ, pE(Θ))
)
, (19)
Eθ−i
[
tEi (Θ)
]
=

Eθ−i
[
θiS
(
qE(Θ), pE(Θ)
)]− ∫ θi
θˆEi
Eθ−i
[
S
(
qE(θ˜i, θ−i), pE(θ˜i, θ−i)
)]
dθ˜i,
∀i,∀θi ≥ θˆEi ,
Eθ−i
[
θˆEi S
(
qE(θˆEi , θ−i), p
E(θˆEi , θ−i)
)]
, ∀i, ∀θi ≤ θˆEi .
The above results mimic those in the exogenous price case. By definition, p0 is completely
independent of the advertisers’ benefit types Θ. As shown in the proof, and as expected
from intuition, p0 > c, because the newsvendor is better off setting a price above the unit
cost c to make a profit in the absence of the secondary revenue. As a result, the virtual price
pˆ
(
Θ, pE(Θ)
)
= max
(
p0,
∑n
i=1 V
+
i (θi)
)
> c, leading to the disappearance of the + operator
in the optimal inventory qE(Θ) in Equation (19). The optimal price pE(Θ) explains why
the newsvendor may choose to offer her product for free. As we can see, when the combined
contributions from the multiple advertisers are sufficiently large, i.e., when
∑n
i=1 V
+
i (θi) > p
0,
the increase in demand and corresponding transfer fees from the advertisers more than
compensate for the lost revenue from her own product sales.
Theorem 2 suggests that the newsvendor’s decision to include an advertiser depends
on the advertiser’s virtual coefficient Vi(θi), as a measure of his net contribution to the
newsvendor. If none of the advertisers merit inclusion in the newsvendor’s contract, the
newsvendor will set the price to p0 and produce the optimal inventory without the secondary
revenue. In addition, the advertisers’ individual cutoff level Vi(θi) is the same as in the
exogenous price model. This is because the newsvendor bases the cutoff level solely on
each advertiser’s virtual benefit type Vi(θi), which consists of the benefit type θi net of the
information cost [1−Ψi(θi)]/ψi(θi), regardless of whether price is a decision variable or not.
We next examine the impact of the advertisers’ benefit types on the optimal price, in-
ventory, and associated expected sales in the following corollary.
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Corollary 2 For any i, the optimal price pE(Θ) decreases in θi, but the optimal inventory
qE(Θ) increases in θi. The optimal expected sales S(q(Θ), p(Θ)) increase in θi.
The characteristics of the optimal solution listed in this corollary ensure that condition
(16) is sufficient for incentive compatibility, and thus the newsvendor’s optimal menu of
contracts presented in Theorem 2 is truth revealing. Based on the direct revelation principle,
this guarantees the optimality of the menu of contracts.
4.3 Discussion of Modeling Results
While the endogenous price model mostly preserves the general results discussed in the
exogenous price case, let us point out three subtle changes.
First, in the endogenous price case, without advertising revenue, the newsvendor always
sets a price above the unit cost c, and the newsvendor’s product is always profit-making.
Therefore, the break-even type analysis for advertisers and the impact of the multiplicity of
advertisers on the newsvendor’s break-even boundary become irrelevant, as the newsvendor
can always break even, regardless of the advertisers’ participation decisions. This contrasts
with the exogenous price case where the break-even boundary is determined by the pooled
net contribution from all advertisers, thus creating interdependence among advertisers.
Second, our results confirm that the inclusion of additional advertisers creates a win-win
situation for all parties involved: the consumers, the advertisers, and the newsvendor. Not
only does the optimal inventory qE(Θ) increase – similar to the exogenous price case – but
also the optimal price pE(Θ) decreases, as suggested by Theorem 2. This evidently benefits
the consumers because they pay a reduced price and enjoy improved service due to the
enhanced fill rate. It also benefits the advertisers because a reduced price and an increased
inventory together imply increased expected sales, leading to increased advertiser expected
profit
∫ θi
θˆEi
Eθ−i
[
S
(
qE(θ˜i, θ−i), pE(θ˜i, θ−i)
)]
dθ˜i. As for the newsvendor, it is impossible for
her to be worse off because she can otherwise set a high enough transfer payment for the new
advertiser to exclude him from the contract while maintaining all other decisions to reap the
same expected profit as before.
A third issue of interest concerns the impact of the newsvendor’s pricing power on the
advertisers’ expected profit, assuming the newsvendor holds the same belief ψi(θi). It is
reasonable to think that in the endogenous price case the newsvendor’s power to control
both price and inventory might enable her to squeeze more benefit from the advertisers,
thereby reducing their informational rent. However, we can find exceptions to this intuition,
for example, in the case where the exogenous price is below cost. Indeed, this means that
the newsvendor is better off producing nothing when each advertiser is above his cutoff
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level but their pooled virtual benefit type is insufficient to cover the newsvendor’s loss (see
region IIc in Figure 2). In this case, each advertiser will be offered a null contract and
thus earn no profit, even though he makes a positive contribution to the newsvendor. In
the endogenous price case, however, this null contract possibility disappears, implying a
higher level of advertiser participation and thus a higher expected profit for the advertisers.
This is because the newsvendor will always choose a price, inventory and transfer payment
that includes all advertisers with a positive virtual benefit type. Therefore, advertisers with
relatively low aggregate virtual benefit types will prefer a price-setting newsvendor to a
price-taking one. An increase in the number of advertisers, however, raises the probability
of the aggregate virtual benefit type exceeding the break-even boundary required by the
price-taking newsvendor, and thus reduces the advertisers’ preference for the price-setting
newsvendor. Similarly, the newsvendor’s pricing power benefits herself through the increased
profitability of her own product and the increased flexibility in writing contracts. In addition,
the newsvendor’s pricing power allows her to increase her reach and reap revenue from the
advertisers whose aggregate contribution would otherwise have been insufficient to cover her
losses in the exogenous price case.
5. Numerical Analysis
When introducing multiple advertisers, the multiplicity of advertisers can be studied in two
ways. Thus far, we have discussed the impact of including additional advertisers on the
newsvendor’s profit and optimal decisions, which has allowed us to discover network effects
among the advertisers, in the exogenous and endogenous cases. Another way of looking at
multiplicity, however, is to assume that multiple advertisers collapse into a single adver-
tiser, i.e., to investigate what happens when the newsvendor faces a single advertiser with
a distribution of benefit types that is the convolution of the benefit types of the individual
advertisers. In this section, we take the second path, and perform numerical analyses to
understand the difference between the single and multiple advertiser cases with comparable
benefit type distribution.
In the representative example reported below, we illustrate our findings by comparing
the equivalent single advertiser case with a two-advertiser case. To create a fair comparison
between the two cases, the distribution of the equivalent single advertiser benefit type is
constructed as the convolution of the benefit types in the two-advertiser case, i.e., θ =
θ1 + θ2, where θ is the benefit type in the single advertiser case, whereas the independent
and identically distributed θ1 and θ2 are the benefit types in the two-advertiser case. In our
analysis, we focus our attention on the effect of the benefit type standard deviation, because
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this parameter connotes the degree of information asymmetry between the newsvendor and
the advertiser(s), which is a central feature of our problem. Moreover, Wu et al. (2011) have
observed the intricate effects of this parameter in their numerical experiments.
The system parameters of the single advertiser case are described as follows: the cost
c = 2 and the exogenous price p = 3. In the endogenous price model, we set the price
sensitivity coefficient τ = 1.5 and the parameter ξ = exp(1.5× 3) = 90 so that y(p = 3) = 1.
That is, the endogenous model has the same demand distribution as the exogenous price
model. We use a gamma distribution for both the demand and the benefit types. The mean
demand E[X]=10, and the standard deviation of demand σ(X) = 10. The mean benefit
type of the single advertiser is fixed at E[θ]=1, and his benefit type standard deviation σ(θ)
varies from 0.5 to 1.5 with step size 0.1. In the two-advertiser case, all the parameters remain
the same, except that the benefit type distribution is split into two. Note that splitting the
gamma distribution halves the shape parameter and skews the distribution to the left. In
other words, compared to the single advertiser case, the chance of there being low benefit
types is higher in the two-advertiser case.
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Figure 3: Expected Inventory in the Exogenous Price Model
We first look at the impact of the benefit type standard deviation on the optimal decisions,
which are shown in Figures 3 and 4. We observe that when the benefit type standard
deviation varies, the expected inventory and price change in the same direction in both the
single and the two-advertiser cases. The direction of change is consistent with the results
of Wu et al. (2011). Moreover, the inventory and the price are less distorted from their
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system-efficient levels (i.e., when complete information is available) in the single advertiser
case than in the two-advertiser case. This may be attributable to the pooling effect, because
the newsvendor faces less uncertainty (as measured by the coefficient of variation) with a
single advertiser than with two equivalent advertisers.
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Figure 4: Expected Inventory and Price in the Endogenous Price Model
We next turn our attention to the impact of the benefit type standard deviation on the
expected profits of the newsvendor and the advertisers. In the exogenous price model, we
observe from Figure 5 that an increase in the standard deviation of the benefit type distri-
bution has the same effect on the newsvendor’s and advertiser’s expected profit regardless
of the number of advertisers, thus confirming the results of Wu et al. (2011) for the single
advertiser problem. Second, we see that the newsvendor is better off with one advertiser
than with two advertisers, which follows from the aforementioned pooling effect. The total
advertisers’ expected profit, however, shows the reverse and is higher in the two-advertiser
case because the newsvendor has to pay more informational rent to the advertisers to induce
truth-telling when facing higher uncertainty.
The results for the endogenous price case are not as clear cut, as shown in Figure 6. First,
the newsvendor’s expected profit behaves similarly to the exogenous case and, in particular,
benefits from the pooling effect. The advertisers’ expected profit, however, behaves slightly
differently and the joint advertisers’ expected profit may be less than the single advertiser’s
expected profit for low standard deviations. One possible explanation for this could be rooted
in the screening instruments that the newsvendor can use for different standard deviations
for the single versus the multiple advertisers case. Our analytical results in Section 4.2 show
that when the benefit type is high, the price charged to the end consumers falls to zero. This
means that the newsvendor can only use inventory as a tool to screen advertisers with high
benefit types, rather than inventory and price. We expect that when the newsvendor is able
to use both inventory and price for screening, she will be able to do so more efficiently and
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Figure 5: Expected Profits in the Exogenous Price Model
give away less rent to the advertiser(s). Now recall that the two-advertiser case is more likely
to see low benefit types, as discussed earlier. As a result, at low standard deviations, the
newsvendor is more likely to be able to use both inventory and price as screening instruments
in the two-advertiser case than in the single advertiser case, thus counteracting the fact that
more uncertainty benefits the advertiser. However, as the standard deviation increases,
which enlarges the right tail of the benefit type distribution, the single and two-advertiser
cases both tend to have more instances in which the optimal price is set to zero, and only
inventory is available to screen the advertisers, thus allowing the pooling effect to dominate.
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Figure 6: Expected Profits in the Endogenous Price Model
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6. Conclusion and Future Research
In this paper, we extend the newsvendor problem to include the secondary revenue generated
by multiple advertisers and focus on the impact of the multiplicity of advertisers on the
newsvendor’s optimal decisions. The second source of revenue often forms a significant part
of the newsvendor’s profit, as evidenced by the magazine and newspaper industry. The
presence of the second source of revenue, however, raises the question of how to charge the
advertisers for the privilege of accessing the newsvendor’s end users. The prices that the
advertisers will be willing to pay are determined by the advertisers’ benefit types, which
are not known to the newsvendor. In this case, to maximize her expected profit, we show
that the newsvendor benefits from a more inclusive pricing contract that links the production
quantity and prices. We use a principal-agent framework to model the newsvendor’s decision
problem, and find the newsvendor’s optimal inventory, price, transfer payment and cutoff
policies.
We confirm that the newsvendor may prefer not to include an advertiser with a low benefit
type and decides to follow a cutoff policy. Interestingly, this cutoff level is unaffected by the
number of advertisers that are interested in the newsvendor’s product, and each advertiser is
included based on his own contribution to the newsvendor’s profit. Second, in the exogenous
price model, we characterize a break-even boundary, which is relevant in the case in which
the primary profit is negative, e.g., in the case of a free newspaper. The break-even boundary
requires that the advertisers’ joint contribution exceed the newsvendor’s loss per unit, and in
that case a contract may be signed even though all participating advertisers are below their
individual break-even benefit level. This creates interdependence among the advertisers as
the newsvendor will offer a real contract based on the pooled contribution of all advertisers
above their cutoff levels. The break-even boundary will disappear if the newsvendor can set
the optimal product price, as intuitively it is always suboptimal to set a price that yields a
negative profit. This implies a higher level of advertiser participation, which benefits both
the newsvendor and the advertisers. Therefore, some advertisers, notably those whose benefit
type is below their individual break-even level, may prefer a price-setting newsvendor over
a price-taking newsvendor. The newsvendor will always prefer to have pricing power as this
increases both her primary and secondary revenue. Third, in the exogenous and endogenous
price cases, the newsvendor problem with secondary revenue displays network effects, and
the entire system is better off if the number of advertisers increases. Finally, however, our
numerical results show that for a given total benefit contribution by all advertisers, the
newsvendor prefers an equivalent single advertiser over multiple advertisers.
Extending the analysis of the newsvendor’s problem with a second source of revenue to
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a setting with multiple advertisers reveals further avenues of research. The first extension
would be to model the different product classes, e.g., advertisement size and placement,
explicitly to introduce a choice model for the advertisers’ demand. Another promising avenue
of future research would be to acknowledge the scarcity of advertising space and introduce
competition among advertisers. This would require the newsvendor to craft an optimal
allocation rule or auction mechanism to maximize her revenue from the limited advertising
space. Intuitively, we expect that this will reduce or even remove the network effects we have
observed in our setting. Finally, we have ignored the impact of advertising on the demand
for the newsvendor’s product. However, the end users’ utility could be influenced by the
amount, quality or content of the advertisements inserted in the publication, as these factors
may affect the end users’ perception of the publication’s content.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
If advertiser i does not participate when his type is θi, then Inequality (4) must hold. It
then follows that Eθ−i [θlS(q(θˇi, θ−i))− ti(θˇi, θ−i)] ≤ Eθ−i [θiS(q(θˇi, θ−i))− ti(θˇi, θ−i)] < 0, for
any θi ≤ θl ≤ θi, and for any θˇi. Therefore, advertiser i will also not participate if his type
is θl, otherwise he will always incur a loss.
Proof of Lemma 2.
If advertiser i reports θˇi, then his expected profit is G(θˇi) = Eθ−i [θiS(q(θˇi, θ−i)) −
ti(θˇi, θ−i)]. The first and second order derivatives of this function are as follows:
dG(θˇi)
dθˇi
= Eθ−i
[
θi
dS(q(θˇi, θ−i))
dθˇi
− dti(θˇi, θ−i)
dθˇi
]
,
d2G(θˇi)
dθˇ2i
= Eθ−i
[
θi
d2S(q(θˇi, θ−i))
dθˇ2i
− d
2ti(θˇi, θ−i)
dθˇ2i
]
.
For the contract to be incentive compatible (i.e., for advertiser i’s optimal report to be
his true type θi), the first order condition (FOC) must be met at θi. That is,
dG(θˇi)
dθˇi
∣∣∣∣
θˇi=θi
= Eθ−i
[
θi
dS(q(Θ))
dθi
− dti(Θ)
dθi
]
= 0. (A-i)
Total differentiation of this FOC with respect to θi yields
Eθ−i
{
[1− F (q(Θ))] dq(Θ)
dθi
+ θi
d2S(q(Θ))
dθ2i
− d
2ti(Θ)
dθ2i
}
= 0,
which is then substituted into the second order derivative at θi to obtain the following:
d2G(θˇi)
dθˇ2i
∣∣∣∣
θˇi=θi
= Eθ−i
[
θi
d2S(q(Θ))
dθ2i
− d
2ti(Θ)
dθ2i
]
= −Eθ−i
{
[1− F (q(Θ))] dq(Θ)
dθi
}
.
Therefore, the second order sufficient condition is satisfied if dq(Θ)/dθi ≥ 0. Later, we
will verify that our optimal solution qA(Θ) meets this monotonicity condition.
Solving the differential equation Eθ−i [dti(Θ)/dθi] = Eθ−i [θidS(q(Θ))/dθi] in Equation
(A-i) yields Eθ−i [ti(Θ)] = Eθ−i
[
θiS(q(Θ))−
∫ θi
θˆi
S(q(θ˜i, θ−i))dθ˜i
]
+K, where the right hand
side follows from integration by parts, and K is a constant. The envelope theorem implies
that advertiser i’s expected profit Eθ−i [θiS(q(Θ))−ti(Θ)] in an incentive compatible contract
is increasing in his type θi, for all θi ≥ θˆi. As a result, the IR constraint must bind at
1
θˆi. Otherwise, the newsvendor can always improve her objective function by increasing
Eθ−i [ti(θˆi, θ−i)] until the IR constraint is binding at θˆi without violating any other types’
participation constraint. This further implies that the constant K = 0.
Proof of Theorem 1.
In this proof, we first show how the reformulation in Equation (6) is obtained, and then
use a sequential optimization approach to solve it for the optimal solutions:
max
q(Θ)≥0, ti(Θ)
EΘ
{
n∑
i=1
[δi(θi)ti(Θ)] + pS(q(Θ))− cq(Θ)
}
= max
q(Θ)≥0, ti(Θ)
n∑
i=1
{
Eθi
{
δi(θi)Eθ−i [ti(Θ)]
}}
+ EΘ {pS(q(Θ))− cq(Θ)}
= max
q(Θ)≥0, Θˆ
n∑
i=1
{
Eθi
{
δi(θi)Eθ−i
[
θiS(q(Θ))−
∫ θi
θˆi
S(q(θ˜i, θ−i))dθ˜i
]}}
+ EΘ {pS(q(Θ))− cq(Θ)}
= max
q(Θ)≥0, Θˆ
EΘ
{
n∑
i=1
[δi(θi)θiS(q(Θ))] + pS(q(Θ))− cq(Θ)
}
−
n∑
i=1
{
Eθi
{
δi(θi)Eθ−i
[∫ θi
θˆi
S(q(θ˜i, θ−i))dθ˜i
]}}
= max
q(Θ)≥0, Θˆ
EΘ
{(
p+
n∑
i=1
[δi(θi)Vi (θi)]
)
S(q(Θ))− cq(Θ)
}
,
2
where the last step follows from the derivation below using integration by parts:
n∑
i=1
{
Eθi
{
δi(θi)Eθ−i
[∫ θi
θˆi
S(q(θ˜i, θ−i))dθ˜i
]}}
=
n∑
i=1
{∫ θ¯i
θi
{
δi(θi)Eθ−i
[∫ θi
θˆi
S(q(θ˜i, θ−i))dθ˜i
]}
dΨi(θi)
}
=
n∑
i=1
{
δi(θi)Eθ−i
[∫ θi
θˆi
S(q(θ˜i, θ−i))dθ˜i
]
Ψi(θi)
∣∣∣∣θi=θ¯i
θi=θi
}
−
n∑
i=1
{∫ θ¯i
θi
Ψi(θi)δi(θi)Eθ−i [S(q(Θ))] dθi
}
=
n∑
i=1
{
Eθ−i
[∫ θ¯i
θˆi
δi(θi)S(q(Θ))dθi
]}
−
n∑
i=1
{∫ θ¯i
θi
Ψi(θi)Eθ−i [δi(θi)S(q(Θ))] dθi
}
=EΘ
{
n∑
i=1
[
δi(θi)
1−Ψi(θi)
ψi(θi)
S(q(Θ))
]}
.
It is worth noting the fact that δi(θi) = 0 for θi ≤ θˆi is used in the above derivation.
We now use a sequential optimization method to solve the problem. Let
∑
−i denote the
summation of all advertisers other than i. It is instrumental to rewrite the newsvendor’s
objective function in Equation (6) as maxθˆi U(θˆi), where
U(θˆi) = max
q(Θ)≥0, θˆ−i
∫ θˆi
θi
Eθ−i
[(
p+
∑
−i
δj(θj)Vj(θj)
)
S(q(Θ))− cq(Θ)
]
ψi(θi)dθi
+
∫ θi
θˆi
Eθ−i
[(
p+ Vi(θi) +
∑
−i
δj(θj)Vj(θj)
)
S(q(Θ))− cq(Θ)
]
ψi(θi)dθi .
The envelope theorem implies that
dU(θˆi)
dθˆi
=Eθ−i
[(
p+
∑
−i
δj(θj)Vj(θj)
)
S(q(θˆi, θ−i))− cq(θˆi, θ−i)
]
ψi(θˆi)
− Eθ−i
[(
p+ Vi(θˆi) +
∑
−i
δj(θj)Vj(θj)
)
S(q(θˆi, θ−i))− cq(θˆi, θ−i)
]
ψi(θˆi)
=− Eθ−i
[
Vi(θˆi)S(q(θˆi, θ−i))
]
ψi(θˆi).
Setting dU(θˆi)/dθˆi to 0 yields Vi(θˆ
A
i ) = 0, where θˆ
A
i is the optimal cutoff level for adver-
tiser i. The optimality of θˆAi stems from the monotonicity of Vi(θˆi) assumed in Assumption
3
1. Due to this assumption, on the left (right) of θˆAi , the newsvendor’s expected profit is
increasing (decreasing), implying that it is unimodel in θˆi. Therefore its maximizer is the
stationary point θˆAi . By the same token, the optimal cutoff levels of all other advertisers can
be characterized in the same fashion.
Now it is immediate that δi(θi)Vi (θi) = V
+
i (θi). Therefore, Equation (6) reduces to
max
q(Θ)≥0
EΘ [pˆ(Θ)S(q(Θ))− cq(Θ)] ,
which mimics the classic newsvendor problem and can be shown to be concave in q(Θ). The
optimal inventory stated in Equation (7) follows from the first order condition in conjunction
with the nonnegativity constraint q(Θ) ≥ 0.
Proof of Corollary 1.
When there is only a single advertiser, i.e., when n = 1, the menu of contracts reduces
to {q(θ1), t1(θ1)}. We can now formulate the newsvendor’s problem in a way similar to
Equations (1)–(3), dropping the expectation over all other advertisers’ types in both the
objective function and the constraints. The results in Corollary 1 are derived by following
exactly the same solution procedure used in Section 3. Not surprisingly, those results are
identical to Theorem 1 of Wu et al. (2011).
Proof of Lemma 3.
Advertiser i attempts to maximize his expected profitG(θˇi) = Eθ−i [θiS(q(θˇi, θ−i), p(θˇi, θ−i))−
ti(θˇi, θ−i)] by choosing to report an appropriate θˇi. If his optimal decision turns out to be
θi, then the contract is incentive compatible. The first and second order derivatives are as
follows:
dG(θˇi)
dθˇi
= Eθ−i
[
θi
dS(q(θˇi, θ−i), p(θˇi, θ−i))
dθˇi
− dti(θˇi, θ−i)
dθˇi
]
,
d2G(θˇi)
dθˇ2i
= Eθ−i
[
θi
d2S(q(θˇi, θ−i), p(θˇi, θ−i))
dθˇ2i
− d
2ti(θˇi, θ−i)
dθˇ2i
]
.
For the contract to be incentive compatible (i.e., for advertiser i’s optimal report to be
his true type θi), the first order condition must be met at θi. That is,
dG(θˇi)
dθˇi
∣∣∣∣
θˇi=θi
= Eθ−i
[
θi
dS(q(Θ), p(Θ))
dθi
− dti(Θ)
dθi
]
= 0. (A-ii)
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Total differentiation of this FOC with respect to θi yields
Eθ−i
{
dS(q(Θ), p(Θ))
dθi
+ θi
d2S(q(Θ), p(Θ))
dθ2i
− d
2ti(Θ)
dθ2i
}
= 0,
which is then substituted into the second order derivative at θi to obtain the following:
d2G(θˇi)
dθˇ2i
∣∣∣∣
θˇi=θi
= Eθ−i
[
θi
d2S(q(Θ), p(Θ))
dθ2i
− d
2ti(Θ)
dθ2i
]
= −Eθ−i
{
dS(q(Θ), p(Θ))
dθi
}
.
Therefore, the second order sufficient condition is satisfied if dS(q(Θ), p(Θ))/dθi ≥ 0,
which is true if dq(Θ)/dθi ≥ 0 and dp(Θ)/dθi ≤ 0, as can be seen from the definition of
S(q(Θ), p(Θ)). Later, we will verify that our optimal solutions qE(Θ) and pE(Θ) meet this
monotonicity condition.
Solving the differential Equation (A-ii) using a similar argument to that in the proof of
Lemma 2 yields the result in Equation (16).
Proof of Theorem 2.
Following similar steps to those in the proof of Theorem 1, we can obtain the objective
function stated in Equation (17), which is then rewritten as maxθˆi U(θˆi), where
U(θˆi) = max
q(Θ)≥0, p(Θ)≥0, θˆ−i
∫ θˆi
θi
Eθ−i
[(
p(Θ) +
∑
−i
δj(θj)Vj(θj)
)
S (q(Θ), p(Θ))− cq(Θ)
]
ψi(θi)dθi
+
∫ θ¯i
θˆi
Eθ−i
[(
p(Θ) + Vi(θi) +
∑
−i
δj(θj)Vj(θj)
)
S (q(Θ), p(Θ))− cq(Θ)
]
ψi(θi)dθi .
The envelope theorem implies that
dU(θˆi)
dθˆi
= Eθ−i
[(
p(θˆi, θ−i) +
∑
−i
δj(θj)Vj(θj)
)
S(q(θˆi, θ−i), p(θˆi, θ−i))− cq(θˆi, θ−i)
]
ψi(θˆi)
− Eθ−i
[(
p(θˆi, θ−i) + Vi(θˆi) +
∑
−i
δj(θj)Vj(θj)
)
S
(
q
(
θˆi, θ−i
)
, p(θˆi, θ−i)
)
− cq(θˆi, θ−i)
]
ψi(θˆi)
= −Eθ−i
[
Vi(θˆi)S(q(θˆi, θ−i), p(θˆi, θ−i))
]
ψi(θˆi).
Setting dU(θˆi)/dθˆi to 0 yields Vi(θˆ
E
i ) = 0, where θˆ
E
i is the optimal cutoff level for adver-
tiser i. The optimality of θˆEi can be argued in the same fashion as that of θˆ
A
i . The optimal
cutoff levels of all other advertisers can be characterized in the same way.
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Now it is immediate that δi(θi)Vi (θi) = V
+
i (θi). Therefore Equation (17) reduces to
max
q(Θ)≥0, p(Θ)≥0
EΘ [pˆ(Θ, p(Θ))S(q(Θ), p(Θ))− cq(Θ)] .
We introduce two transformations of variable. The first transformation defines the stock-
ing factor z(Θ) = q(Θ)/y(p(Θ)), and the second treats pˆ(Θ, p(Θ)) as a decision variable in
place of p(Θ). As a result, the original joint optimization over p(Θ) and q(Θ) is transformed
into the joint optimization over pˆ and z (the arguments of pˆ(Θ, p(Θ)) and z(Θ) are omitted
for brevity):
max
pˆ≥∑ni=1 V +i (θi), z≥0EΘ
{
y
(
pˆ−
n∑
i=1
V +i (θi)
)
{pˆEX [min(z, x)]− cz}
}
.
We next follow the sequential optimization approach to characterize the optimal solution.
We find it convenient to first optimize the stocking factor z for a given pˆ, and then substitute
the optimal stocking factor as a function of pˆ back into the objective function to turn it into
a single variable optimization problem:
max
pˆ≥∑ni=1 V +i (θi) EΘ
{
y
(
pˆ−
n∑
i=1
V +i (θi)
)
R(pˆ)
}
, (A-iii)
where R(p) defines the maximum profit of a standard newsvendor problem for a given price
p:
R(p) = max
z≥0
{pEX [min(z, x)]− cz} .
The well-known critical fractile solution yields
z∗(p) = F−1
[
(p− c)+
p
]
, and R(p) = p
∫ z∗(p)
0
xf(x)dx.
The above results indicate that we can restrict our attention to the case p > c only,
because otherwise z∗(p) = R(p) = 0 for whatever price p, i.e., the newsvendor will always
produce nothing and thus make 0 profit. Noting that dy(p)/dp = −τy(p), we can write the
first order derivative of the newsvendor’s objective function in Equation (A-iii) with respect
to pˆ as follows.
EΘ
{
y
(
pˆ−
n∑
i=1
V +i (θi)
)(
R
′
(pˆ)− τR(pˆ)
)}
. (A-iv)
Next we will show that the function R′(p)−τR(p) is strictly concave with two roots c and
p0, where p0 > c. We first note that dz∗(p)/dp = 1/ [ph(z∗(p))] , where h(x) = f(x)/[1−F (x)]
6
is the failure rate of the random shock x. Furthermore, we have:
R′(p) =
cz∗(p)
p
+
∫ z∗(p)
0
xf(x)dx, R′′(p) =
c
p2h(z∗(p))
, R′′′(p) = − c
p3h(z∗(p))
[
h′(z∗(p))
h2(z∗(p))
+ 2
]
.
As the failure rate h(x) is non-negative and its derivative h′(x) is also non-negative by
the IFR assumption, R′′(p) ≥ 0 and R′′′(p) < 0. Therefore, the second order derivative of
R′(p)− τR(p), given by R′′′(p)− τR′′(p), is strictly negative. This implies the concavity of
R′(p)− τR(p). As a result, it has at most two roots.
We next show that R′(p) − τR(p) has exactly two distinct roots c and p0, and p0 > c.
As R′(c) = R(c) = 0, c is a root. Furthermore, R′(p) − τR(p) strictly increases at p = c
because its first order derivative at c is 1/[ch(0)] > 0. This implies that there exists some
p > c such that R′(p)− τR(p) > 0. On the other hand, limp→∞[R′(p)− τR(p)] < 0 because
by L’Hopital’s rule, this limit is limp→∞ c/[ph(z∗(p))] +E[X]−∞, but the first term goes to
0 by the IFR assumption. Therefore, in the region (c,∞), R′(p) − τR(p) has another root
p0, as it must cross 0 once from positive to negative.
The above analysis reveals that the first order derivative in Equation (A-iv) has two roots
c and p0, though root c is a local minimizer. Furthermore, the derivative is strictly positive
in (c, p0) and strictly negative in (p0,∞). This implies that p0 is the unique maximizer
of the unconstrained problem. For the constrained problem, the optimal virtual price is
pˆE = max(p0,
∑n
i=1 V
+
i (θi)). Then, the optimal price p
E(Θ) and optimal inventory qE(Θ)
are derived from the definitions of the virtual price pˆ and stocking factor z, respectively. The
optimal expected transfer payment Eθ−i [ti(Θ)] follows from substituting the optimal price
pE(Θ) and optimal inventory qE(Θ) into equation (16).
Proof of Corollary 2.
(i). The optimal price pE(Θ) = p0 −∑ni=1 V +i (θi), if ∑ni=1 V +i (θi) ≤ p0; and 0 otherwise.
Therefore it is (weakly) decreasing in θi due to Assumption 1.
(ii). The optimal inventory qE(Θ) = y
[
p0 −∑ni=1 V +i (θi)]F−1 [(p0 − c)/p0], if∑ni=1 V +i (θi) ≤
p0; and y(0)F−1
[(∑n
i=1 V
+
i (θi)− c
)
/
∑n
i=1 V
+
i (θi)
]
otherwise. In the former case, F−1 [(p0 − c)/p0]
is independent of θi, while y
[
p0 −∑ni=1 V +i (θi)] increases in θi. Hence, qE(Θ) increases in θi.
In the latter case, y(0) is a constant while F−1
[(∑n
i=1 V
+
i (θi)− c
)
/
∑n
i=1 V
+
i (θi)
]
increases
in θi. Hence, q
E(Θ) increases in θi.
(iii). Parts (i) and (ii) above together imply that the optimal expected sales S(q(Θ), p(Θ)) =
EX
{
min
[
qE(Θ), y(pE(Θ))x
]}
increase in θi, due to the decreasing property of the y(·) func-
tion.
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Thank you for your decision to accept our paper to European Journal of Operational
Research with minor revisions. We have addressed all the remaining points either in the text
or in the letter to the referee.
We hope that you and the referees will find that the new version of the paper is now
ready for publication. We look forward to hearing from you soon in the hope of positive
news.
Once more, thank you for your time and effort as an editor for this paper.
Best regards.
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Response to Referee 2
We thank you for your further detailed feedback on the paper. We were glad to read that
you generally approved of the revision, and hope that this version will address all remaining
issues.
Content
1. Defend the case where the sales do not depend on p. Why would this be reasonable?
The sales function S(q) = EX [min(q, x)] refers to the sales volume not the revenue. The
sales revenue is pS(q). However, the sales volume function S(q) itself is independent of
p in the exogenous price case: as the price p is assumed to be given and constant in the
exogenous case, it can be implied in the demand function without having to be made
explicit. In order to reduce the complexity of notation to a minimum, we have chosen
to do so in the paper for the exogenous price case. After solving the newsvendor’s
optimization problem, we confirm that the optimal inventory qA is a function of the
exogenous price p.
Obviously, in the endogenous case, price becomes variable and influences demand, and
has to be expressed explicitly in the demand and sales function.
2. Is it reasonable for the newsvendor and all advertisers to have same distribution of
prior beliefs ψi(θi)?
We apply standard economic theory that assumes the prior beliefs, i.e., the distribution
of θi, are shared and common knowledge. For example, Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)
note that “[...] types are drawn from independent distributions. [...] the distributions
are common knowledge” (page 268).
As our focus in this paper is to obtain insights into the newsvendor’s problem in
the presence of secondary revenue from multiple advertisers, we adopted standard
methodologies and assumed the same prior beliefs in our model, although we agree
that in reality the newsvendor and advertisers may hold different prior beliefs. We also
note that even if different prior beliefs are used, the qualitative insights of our paper
will remain unchanged.
3. You say, “if any advertiser’s benefit type is above his cutoff level, the newsvendor will
have to solve the mechanism design problem.” Why would the newsvendor know this
in advance of solving the problem?
We agree that this sentence in the previous version was not clear. We did not mean to
imply that the newsvendor would know in advance when to solve the mechanism design
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problem or not — your understanding that she cannot do so is correct. We meant
to say that the mechanism design problem will only be relevant and its constraints
binding when at least one advertiser exceeds his cutoff level. However, as this sentence
caused confusion and essentially duplicated the previous two sentences by presenting
the complement of what happened when at least one advertiser was above his cutoff
level, we have decided to delete it.
4. When you get to Figure 2, you have not yet defined θbi?
As per your recommendation in the points relating to the writing style, we have ex-
panded our list of notation to include the cutoff level θbi . Furthermore, we now explicitly
refer to the cutoff level in the discussion of Figure 2:
“It is interesting to note that due to network effects, in the dotted portion of region
IIIc, even though both advertisers are individually below the break-even benefit level
(θbi ), their pooled contribution to the newsvendor’s profit is enough to encourage pro-
duction.”
5. Can you defend why the exogenous case is important to work with? Give me an example
of when this would happen in the newspaper/magazine context you are using?
In some regions, prices in the publishing industry are relatively stable over time. For
example, the Time magazine in the US changed its newsstand price to $4.95 in 2006
and still sells at that price now. The New York Times last hiked its price in 2009. Our
exogenous case is applicable in these examples.
Furthermore, the exogenous price case is a stepping stone to study the more interesting
endogenous price case. Analyzing both cases allows us to understand the different roles
inventory and price play as instruments to discriminate between advertisers’ benefit
types.
Writing
1. Do not begin sentences with “there are”, “it is”, etc. Doing so represents poor writing
style.
We have eliminated many of those instances.
2. You appear to have a missing “E” both in Corollary 1 and at the bottom of page 13
We do not require an expectation E−i in Corollary 1, since there is only one advertiser
and −i is empty.
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On page 13, we present one out of many possible payment schemes that would respect
the optimality conditions. The optimality conditions are only specified up to an expec-
tation over −i: thus the transfer fee can be determined as a function of a given Θ−i,
as long as in expectation that function will satisfy the optimality conditions.
3. Better describe what you mean by “pooled, single advertiser”, and please justify why
you only consider the benefit type θ1 + θ2.
We have changed the sentence in the introduction which referred to a “pooled, single
advertiser” since it has not been defined yet at that moment. It now reads:
“Finally, our numerical results show that the newsvendor prefers an equivalent single
advertiser to multiple advertisers due to the pooling effect.”
In the numerical section, we define that the equivalent single advertiser has a proba-
bility distribution of benefit types that is the convolution of the benefit types of two
advertisers. In order to have comparable situations for the multiple and single adver-
tiser case, the equivalent single advertiser’s benefit type is the sum of the individual
benefit types because the total transfer fee earned and the total benefit accrued are
additive.
4. Provide a more comprehensive list of notation, perhaps broken into categories, because
this paper is extremely dense in notation. The result is that the reader must go back
and search for what each incarnation of θ means.
We have taken your advice to expand our list of notation and have included the cutoff
and break-even benefit type in that list.
5. Set off the single advertiser case on page 12 by beginning a new paragraph at : “Note
that the newsvendor’s problem...” Throughout, you should set this off as a special case,
to keep your thoughts organized and to aid the reader.
We have taken your advice to break that paragraph and highlight the comparison with
the results from the single advertiser case, allowing us to preface Corollary 1 with a
more explicit introduction.
“Note that the newsvendor’s problem with multiple advertisers reduces to a problem
with a single advertiser if all other advertisers −i are below their cutoff levels. The
following corollary shows that the results in the multiple advertisers case can be reduced
to those obtained in Wu et al. (2011) for the single advertiser case.”
6. Second paragraph under “Discussion of Modeling Results” on page 18: Add comma
after ‘c’ to break up two independent clauses.
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We have done so.
7. Discussions after results are not written from a managerial perspective. They restate
the result. Can you explain in a more effective way?
We have opted to keep all the managerial discussion within the (sub)sections titled
“Discussion of Modeling Results” (3.4 and 4.3) and “Numerical Analysis” (5). The
discussion immediately after the theorems and corollaries express in words the mean-
ing of the obtained results. Following your suggestion that we write from a more
managerial perspective, we have made some changes to add more interpretation to our
discussion though. For instance, after Theorem 2, we have added the discussion of the
phenomenon of free newspapers.
Many thanks for your contributions to the improvement of this paper.
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Response to Referee 3
We are very grateful for your comments throughout the several rounds of revision which
have helped improve the paper. We thank you for your time and effort, as well as for your
kind congratulations on our last manuscript.
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